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Abstract
The prisoner’s dilemma describes a conflict between a pair of players, in which defection is a
dominant strategy whereas cooperation is collectively optimal. The iterated version of the dilemma
has been extensively studied to understand the emergence of cooperation. In the evolutionary
context, the iterated prisoner’s dilemma is often combined with population dynamics, in which
a more successful strategy replicates itself with a higher growth rate. Here, we investigate the
replicator dynamics of three representative strategies, i.e., unconditional cooperation, unconditional
defection, and tit-for-tat, which prescribes reciprocal cooperation by mimicking the opponents
previous move. Our finding is that the dynamics is self-dual in the sense that it remains invariant
when we apply time reversal and exchange the fractions of unconditional cooperators and defectors
in the population. The duality implies that the fractions can be equalized by tit-for-tat players,
although unconditional cooperation is still dominated by defection. Furthermore, we find that
mutation among the strategies breaks the exact duality in such a way that cooperation is more
favored than defection, as long as the cost-to-benefit ratio of cooperation is small.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Although a society consists of individuals, the collective interest is not an aggregate of
individual ones. The prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game is a toy model to illustrate such a social
dilemma. The PD game can be formulated as follows: Suppose that we have two players,
say, Alice and Bob. When Alice cooperates, it benefits Bob by a certain amount of b at
her own cost c. If she defects, on the other hand, it does not incur any cost and Bob gains
nothing. If c exceeds b, defection obviously drives out cooperation, so we restrict ourselves
to 0 < c < b. The cost-to-benefit ratio, c/b, is thus limited to an open interval (0, 1). The
resulting payoff matrix between cooperation (C) and defection (D) is expressed as
C D
C
D
(
b− c − c
b 0
)
,
(1)
from the row-player Alice’s point of view, and the game is symmetric to both players. The
collective interest is maximized when both choose C, but D is the rational choice for each
individual, hence a dilemma.
By construction of the PD game, unconditional defection (AllD) always constitutes a Nash
equilibrium. However, it has been widely known by folk theorems that a cooperative strat-
egy can also be rational if the PD game is repeated indefinitely with high enough probability
because one’s cooperation can be reciprocated by the other’s in future. This is called direct
reciprocity and has been popularized by Axelrod’s tournament of the iterated prisoner’s
dilemma (IPD) [1]. We assume that the repetition probability approaches one. An archety-
pal strategy of direct reciprocity is Tit-for-tat (TFT). It begins with C at the first encounter
and then replicates the co-player’s last move. Except the first round, therefore, it cooperates
only if the co-player cooperated last time. We may call it a conditional cooperator, opposed
to an unconditional cooperator (AllC). We will explain that the interactions between the
aforementioned strategies, i.e., AllD, TFT, and AllC, are rather subtle, indicating the com-
plexity in evolution of cooperation. Earlier studies have already focused on the dynamics of
these three representative strategies [2–4].
All these fall into a class of reactive strategies [5] represented by a two-component array α =
(PC , PD), where PC (PD) means the probability to cooperate when the co-player cooperated
(defected) last time. In this notation, we have AllC = (1, 1), AllD = (0, 0), and TFT =
(1, 0). If error occurs with probability e at each time step, the effective behavior is described
as α′ = ((1 − e)PC + e(1 − PC), (1 − e)PD + e(1 − PD)) = (P ′C, P ′D). The error rate e is
assumed to be small, and this statement will be made quantitative later. Suppose that two
strategies α = (PC , PD) and β = (QC , QD) meet in the IPD. They effectively behave as
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α′ and β ′, respectively, and stochastically visit four states, CC,CD,DC, and DD, where
the former (latter) symbol means the move of the player adopting α (β). The transition
probabilities between the states can be arranged in the following matrix [6, 7]:
M˜ =


P ′CQ
′
C P
′
DQ
′
C P
′
CQ
′
D P
′
DQ
′
D
P ′C(1−Q′C) P ′D(1−Q′C) P ′C(1−Q′D) P ′D(1−Q′D)
(1− P ′C)Q′C (1− P ′D)Q′C (1− P ′C)Q′D (1− P ′D)Q′D
(1− P ′C)(1−Q′C) (1− P ′D)(1−Q′C) (1− P ′C)(1−Q′D) (1− P ′D)(1−Q′D)

 .
(2)
This stochastic matrix is irreducible and positive definite, so the Perron-Frobenius theorem
guarantees the existence of a unique right eigenvector ~v = (vCC , vCD, vDC , vDD) with the
largest eigenvalue Λ = 1. If we normalize ~v in such a way that vCC + vCD + vDC + vDD = 1,
it is the stationary probability distribution over the four states when the strategies α and
β are adopted in the IPD. The long-term payoff of α against β per round is obtained by
calculating an inner product pαβ = ~v · ~h1, where ~h1 = (b − c,−c, b, 0). Likewise, we obtain
pβα = ~v · ~h2 with ~h2 = (b − c, b,−c, 0). If we list the three strategies in the order of AllC,
AllD, and TFT, the matrix p˜ = {pαβ} can be written as follows:
p˜ =


(b− c)(1− e) be− c(1− e) b(1− 2e+ 2e2)− c(1− e)
b(1− e)− ce (b− c)e 2b(1− e)e− ce
b(1 − e)− c(1− 2e+ 2e2) be− 2c(1− e)e (b− c)/2

 . (3)
Note that the limit of e→ 0 does not coincide with the case of e = 0: If e was strictly zero
between two TFT players, each of them would earn b − c at each round. For any e > 0,
however, the average payoff per round reduces to (b− c)/2 as written in Eq. (3). All these
results are fully consistent with existing ones such as in Refs. 8, 9.
In an evolutionary framework, we consider dynamics of a well-mixed population in which
random pairs of individuals play the IPD game. Let us assume that the population is so
large that stochastic fluctuations can be ignored. If a certain strategy earns a higher payoff
than the population average, we can expect that its fraction will grow at a rate proportional
to the payoff difference from the population average. Likewise, a strategy with a lower
payoff than the population average will decrease in its fraction. Replicator dynamics (RD)
expresses this idea by using a set of deterministic equations for the time evolution of the
fractions. Let Ns be the total number of strategies in the population. We have Ns = 3
in a set of the three strategies, i.e., {AllC, AllD, TFT}. We are interested in the fraction
xα of strategy α, with a normalization condition that
∑
α xα = 1. The long-term payoff of
strategy α from the whole population is denoted as
pα =
∑
β
pαβxβ. (4)
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RD describes the time evolution of xα as follows:
dxα
dt
=
∑
β
qαβpβxβ − 〈p〉xα, (5)
where qαβ’s are elements of a transition matrix between strategies. The average payoff of
the population is denoted as 〈p〉 ≡ ∑α pαxα = ∑αβ pαβxαxβ . If we choose the transition
matrix as
qαβ =
{
1− µ for α = β
µ/(Ns − 1) for α 6= β,
(6)
RD takes the following form:
dxα
dt
= (1− µ)pαxα − 〈p〉xα + µ
Ns − 1
∑
β 6=α
pβxβ, (7)
where µ is a mutation rate, assumed to satisfy µ ≪ e. The first term on the right-hand
side means growth with a rate proportional to the payoff, the second term normalizes the
total sum of xα’s, and the last term describes mutation. Note that the fitness of strategy α
is identified with its payoff pα(t), so that it produces offspring in proportion to pα(t)xα(t)
between time t and t + dt. The mutation structure in Eq. (6) means that some of these
offspring are randomly picked up and change the strategy to one of the others.
In this work, we will show the following: If µ vanishes, the time evolution of xAllC in RD
is the same as that of xAllD under time reversal, t → −t, and vice versa. The duality does
not exactly hold for µ > 0, and we will discuss its consequences by analyzing the system
perturbatively.
II. FIXED-POINT STRUCTURE
For the sake of notational convenience, we define x1 ≡ xAllC, x2 ≡ xAllD, and x3 ≡ xTFT
henceforth. Due to the normalization condition, we have only two independent variables,
which we choose as x1 and x2. Plugging Eq. (4) into Eq. (7), we find a set of equations,
which can be formally written as follows:
dx1
dt
= f1(x1, x2; e, µ) (8)
dx2
dt
= f2(x1, x2; e, µ). (9)
After a little algebra, one can show that
f1(x1, x2; e, µ) + f2(x2, x1; e, µ) =
1
2
µ(b− c)(1− 3x1), (10)
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FIG. 1: Explicit example of duality. (a) An evolutionary trajectory resulting from the mutation-
free RD. (b) A mirror image of the left panel upon time reversal and exchange between AllC and
AllD. At the same time, it shows a completely legitimate trajectory under the same dynamics.
which becomes zero as µ vanishes. Note that x1 and x2 exchange their positions when they
are arguments of f2 in Eq. (10). If we set µ = 0 and define τ ≡ −t, therefore,
dx1
dτ
= −dx1
dt
= −f1(x1, x2; e, 0) = f2(x2, x1; e, 0) (11)
dx2
dτ
= −dx2
dt
= −f2(x1, x2; e, 0) = f1(x2, x1; e, 0) (12)
By introducing X1 ≡ x2 and X2 ≡ x1, we find that
dX1
dτ
= f1(X1, X2; e, 0) (13)
dX2
dτ
= f2(X1, X2; e, 0), (14)
which recovers the original dynamics. In other words, the dynamics is dual under time
reversal and exchange of x1 and x2. Suppose that we have observed a trajectory (x1(t), x2(t))
under RD with µ = 0. Even if we exchange the names of AllC and AllD populations and
trace the trajectory backward in time, we will obtain a valid trajectory governed by the
same RD due to the duality (Fig. 1). As a consequence, for a given fixed point (FP) (x1, x2),
there must be a mirror FP (x2, x1). Furthermore, the duality also imposes a constraint on
the stability: If one is stable, for example, the other must be unstable. Suppose that RD has
a single FP. We then have to conclude that x1 = x2 because (x1, x2) = (x2, x1). In addition,
due to the stability constraint, it must be either a saddle or a neutrally stable point.
The question is the number of FP’s in this dynamics. When µ = 0, it is relatively easy to
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TABLE I: Eigenvalues and eigenvectors of each FP when µ = 0 [Eq. (15)]. We have defined
A ≡ c2 − b2(1− 2e), B ≡ 2bc√1− 2e, and C ≡ c2 + b2(1− 2e).
FP eigenvalue eigenvector eigenvalue eigenvector
FP1 c(1− 2e) (−1, 1) ce(1 − 2e) (1, 0)
FP2 −c(1− 2e) (−1, 1) −ce(1− 2e) (0, 1)
FP3
c(1−2e)(b−c−2be)
b−c (−1, 1) − ce(b−c−2be)b−c (1, 0)
FP4 − c(1−2e)(b−c−2be)b−c (−1, 1) ce(b−c−2be)b−c (0, 1)
FP5 −12(1− 2e)(b − c− 2be) (0, 1) 12(1− 2e)(b − c− 2be) (1, 0)
FP6 i
c
√
1−2e(b−c−2be)
2b (A+Bi,C) -i
c
√
1−2e(b−c−2be)
2b (A−Bi,C)
calculate each FP:
(x1, x2) =


(1, 0) ≡ FP1
(0, 1) ≡ FP2(
b(1−2e)−c
(b−c)(1−2e) , 0
)
≡ FP3(
0, b(1−2e)−c
(b−c)(1−2e)
)
≡ FP4
(0, 0) ≡ FP5(
b(1−2e)−c
2b(1−2e) ,
b(1−2e)−c
2b(1−2e)
)
≡ FP6
(15)
If b(1 − 2e) ≥ c, all these FP’s are feasible, that is, all xi’s (i = 1, 2, 3) belong to the unit
interval [0, 1]. Otherwise, only FP1, FP2, and FP5 will remain available. We assume that
e is small in the sense that c < b(1 − 2e) for values of b and c considered in this work.
The eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the differential equation of Eqs. (8) and (9) with µ = 0
are given in Table I. For µ > 0, we cannot find all FP’s in closed forms because they are
involved with a sixth-order polynomial equation. It is more instructive to calculate them in
a perturbative way for small µ. We obtain the perturbative solution by using the Newton
method, in which the FP’s for µ = 0 serve as trial solutions. Let us denote any of the trial
solutions as (x1, x2), whereas the corresponding solution for µ > 0 as (x
∗
1, x
∗
2). From the
Taylor expansion around the FP:
0 = f1(x
∗
1, x
∗
2) = f1(x1, x2) + (x
∗
1 − x1)
∂f1
∂x1
+ (x∗2 − x2)
∂f1
∂x2
+ . . . (16)
0 = f2(x
∗
1, x
∗
2) = f2(x1, x2) + (x
∗
1 − x1)
∂f2
∂x1
+ (x∗2 − x2)
∂f2
∂x2
+ . . . , (17)
we observe that (
x∗1
x∗2
)
≈
(
x1
x2
)
−
(
∂f1
∂x1
∂f1
∂x2
∂f2
∂x1
∂f2
∂x2
)−1(
f1(x1, x2)
f2(x1, x2)
)
. (18)
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The resulting expressions for µ > 0 are the followings:
(x∗1, x
∗
2) ≈


(1, 0) + µ
(
(b−c)(1−e2)
2ce(1−2e) ,
−(b−c)(1−e)
2c(1−2e)
)
(0, 1) + µ
(
(b−c)e
2c(1−2e) ,
−(b−c)(1+e)
2c(1−2e)
)
(
b(1−2e)−c
(b−c)(1−2e) , 0
)
+ µ
(
[b−c−3(b+c)e][2bc(1−e+e2)−(b2+c2)(1−e)]
2c(b−c)e(1−2e)(b−c−2be) ,− (b−c)
2(1−e)−2bce2
2c(1−2e)(b−c−2be)
)
(
0, b(1−2e)−c
(b−c)(1−2e)
)
+ µ
(
e[(b−c)2+2bce]
2c(1−2e)(b−c−2be) ,
[(b−c)2+2bce][b−c−3(b+c)e]
2c(b−c)(1−2e)(b−c−2be)
)
(0, 0) + µ
(
− (b−c)
2(1−2e)(b−c−2be) ,
(b−c)
2(1−2e)(b−c−2be)
)
(
b(1−2e)−c
2b(1−2e) ,
b(1−2e)−c
2b(1−2e)
)
+ µ
(
b(b−c)(b−3c−2be)
4c2(1−2e)(b−c−2be) ,− b(b−c)(b−3c−2be)4c2(1−2e)(b−c−2be)
)
.
(19)
Recall that we are concerned with a parameter region of c < b(1 − 2e). We discard the
first, third, and fifth solutions because they admit negative fractions in this region. We
will denote the other three as FP∗2, FP
∗
4, and FP
∗
6, respectively. Some of them can also be
unfeasible, however, because an implicit assumption behind Eq. (19) is that the perturbed
solutions still exist in the real domain, which may not be always true. It turns out that FP∗2
and FP∗4 can be complex unless we restrict the ranges of e and µ. In Appendix, we derive
the following set of inequalities to make FP∗2 and FP
∗
4 real, provided that µ≪ e≪ 1:
e . emax ≡ −b
2 + 3bc + 4c2 +
√
9b4 − 18b3c+ 37b2c2 − 44bc3 + 52c4
2(2b2 + bc+ 9c2)
(20)
µ . µmax ≡ c
2e(1− 2e)
(b− c)2 − e(b2 − 3bc− 4c2)− e2(2b2 − bc− 9c2) . (21)
We plot the upper bounds emax and µmax in Fig. 2. From Fig. 2(a), we see that the first
inequality is always satisfied as long as e ≪ 1. For given e and µ, one can solve µ > µmax
to estimate the range of c that makes FP∗2 and FP
∗
4 complex, leaving only FP
∗
6 as a possible
outcome. The point is that FP∗6, the last one in Eq. (19), is the most robust one which
remains feasible over the range of c under consideration. To tell if it is actually accessible,
we should analyze its stability. Table I shows that it is neutrally stable at µ = 0 because its
eigenvalues are purely imaginary. Let us denote the eigenvalues as λ±6 , where ± means the
sign in front. If we introduce small yet positive µ, they begin to contain a real part with a
magnitude of O(µ):
Re(λ±6 ) ≈ −µ
(b− c)[(b− c)2 + 2c2]
4c(b− c− 2be) , (22)
which is negative in our parameter region. It means that FP∗6 will be stable in the presence
of mutation so that nearby trajectories will be attracted to that point. If c < b(1 − 2e)/3,
the correction is positive for x1 and negative for x2. Mutation breaks the duality between
cooperators and defectors, and it does in a way that favors and stabilizes cooperation.
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FIG. 2: Upper bounds of e and µ for both FP∗2 and FP
∗
4 in Eq. (19) to be real, under the assumption
that µ≪ e≪ 1. (a) The inequality for e [Eq. (20)] is always satisfied for e≪ 1. (b) If µ > µmax,
FP∗2 and FP
∗
4 disappear from the real domain.
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FIG. 3: Numerical integration of RD for (a) c = 0.8 and (b) c = 0.9, with e = 10−2 and µ = 10−4.
In each panel, we plot trajectories for two different initial conditions, (x1, x2) = (0, 3, 0.4) and
(0.8, 0.1), represented by the crosses. When c = 0.8, both converge to FP∗6 with x1 = x2 ≈
(1− c/b)/2. On the other hand, if c = 0.9, one of them is attracted to FP∗2 ≈ (0, 1).
III. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We have performed numerical calculations to check our analytic calculations in the previous
section. We fix b as unity without loss of generality. We have chosen e = 10−2, so the
inequality b(1 − 2e) > c is satisfied for 0 < c < 0.98. Integrating Eq. (7) from an initial
condition, we remove transient behavior and calculate the time averages of xα defined as
follows:
xα = lim
T→∞
1
T − T0
∫ T
To
xα dt, (23)
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FIG. 4: xi as a function of c from numerical integration of RD. Fixing b = 1 and e = 10
−2, we
try two different values for the mutation rate (a) µ = 0 and (b) µ = 10−4, respectively. The lines
represent the last solution in Eq. (19), denoted as FP∗6. We have checked an exhaustive list of
initial fractions with mesh size 110 (see text). For some c, xi looks multi-valued because the system
approaches different attractors depending on the initial condition.
where T0 is transient time. Note that the dynamics may have multiple attractors: Fig-
ures 3(a) and (b) show numerical integration of RD when c = 0.8 and c = 0.9, respectively.
Sometimes every initial condition leads to the same result on average [Fig. 3(a)]. Then, we
can express any of xi’s (i = 1, 2, 3) as a function of c. However, if this is not the case, as
illustrated in Fig. 3(b), we have to test many different initial conditions, and the resulting
xi will be multi-valued for given c. To sample the initial condition, we use an exhaustive
search with mesh size 1
10
. That is, we check initial conditions of (AllC, AllD, TFT) =
( 1
10
, 1
10
, 8
10
), ( 1
10
, 2
10
, 7
10
), . . . , ( 8
10
, 1
10
, 1
10
).
In Fig. 4(a), we have depicted how xi depends on c when µ = 0. For c . cb ≈ 0.8, every
initial condition yields the same result in the long run, which agrees with FP∗6 very well. For
c > cb, the system is bistable and we get two different pairs of (x1, x2). One of them still
agrees with FP6, while the other coincides with FP2 = (0, 1). Figure 4(b) shows the case of
µ = 10−4, for which the overall behavior is essentially same as in Fig. 4(a) except at small
c. This is because ∆xi = x
∗
i − xi is of O(µ/c2) in FP∗6, as presented in Eq. (19). Hence
the correction due to µ = 10−4 is visible only for c ∼ O(µ1/2) = O(10−2). Interestingly, the
correction term in FP∗6 has singularity at c = 0, whereas the fractions x
∗
1 and x
∗
2 must be
bounded. For this reason, our perturbative analysis obviously breaks down as c→ 0. Having
said that, the agreement in Fig. 4 is truly remarkable. On the other hand, the existence of
multiple FP’s is detected only at c > cb, although Eq. (21) is satisfied for c & 0.09 according
to our parameters b = 1, e = 10−2 and µ = 10−4. It suggests that FP∗5 has small basins of
attraction, compared to our mesh size: The population is mostly occupied by AllD at FP∗4,
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but it cannot be sustained unless the TFT population is very small.
IV. DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY
Before concluding this work, let us consider how our observation can be generalized. In
fact, the structure of RD seems to be crucial for the existence of such duality: We have
also checked the same strategy set with the Moran process for a finite population [5, 10–12],
but we do not find such a symmetry between AllC and AllD (not shown). In this sense,
the duality between AllC and AllD is not universal. Another related question is whether
other sets of strategies can also exhibit the same kind of duality, provided that RD governs
time evolution. To be more specific, let i, j, and k be three different strategies, i.e., i 6= j,
j 6= k, and i 6= k with fractions xi, xj , and xk, respectively. Just as Eqs. (8) to (10), the
duality means that fi(xi, xj) + fj(xj , xi) = 0 when mutation is absent. It turns out that
our strategy set is not the only possibility: One particularly interesting case of duality is
such that i =AllC and j =AllD as before, whereas k =TFT is replaced by anti-TFT, which
is a reactive strategy described as (PC , PD) = (0, 1). Therefore, the duality alone does not
determine which strategy set one should work with. We believe that one should first define
a larger set of strategies from a general constraint, such as memory length, and then pick
up the most important ones therein a posteriori. Along this line, the choice of AllC, AllD,
and TFT becomes most meaningful in an environment with a moderate value of c, where
TFT occupies a substantial fraction of the population and other surviving strategies can be
classified into cooperative and non-cooperative ones.
To summarize, we have investigated IPD of three representative strategies, AllC, AllD, and
TFT, by analyzing RD as a dynamical system. We have shown duality between the fractions
of cooperators and defectors in the absence of mutation. The effects of small positive µ have
been studied in a perturbative manner: Mutation enhances cooperation if c/b . 1/3 and
stabilizes the corresponding fixed point. The enhancement becomes significant especially for
c/b < O(µ1/2). These results have been confirmed by numerical calculations. Our finding
implies that evolutionary dynamics may have a variety of emergent symmetries. According
to this picture, a defecting population can be viewed as a cooperating population traveling
backward in time, and vice versa, in the presence of TFT.
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Derivation of Eq. (21)
As µ increases from zero, FP∗2 and FP
∗
4, the second and fourth solutions in Eq. (19), become
complex via a saddle-node bifurcation. When the bifurcation point is approached, the
deviation of x1 from zero is entirely due to µ, whereas the deviation of x2 from unity has a
contribution from e. It is therefore plausible to assume that x1 ≪ 1 − x2. We thus expand
f1(x1, x2;µ) and f2(x1, x2;µ) in Eqs. (8) and (9) around (x1, x2) = (0, 1) to the linear order
in x1 and to the second order in (1− x2).
By solving dx1/dt = dx2/dt = 0 in this set of reduced equations, we explicitly obtain
approximate formulas for the FP’s. They contain a common factor, which we denote as√
g(b, c, e, µ), and this is the only factor that can make the FP’s complex. We simplify g by
expanding it to the linear order in µ, and calculate the conditions for it to be non-negative.
One of the resulting sets of conditions is written in Eqs. (20) and (21). The other has been
discarded because it is valid only for a high error rate.
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